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Résumé : Tout en situant la méthode introspective de Titchener dans l’en-
vironnement intellectuel de la psychologie expérimentale naissante, nous exa-
minons la notion d’erreur du stimulus proposée par ce savant dans l’étude
de l’expérience mentale. Nous suivons l’évolution ultérieure de l’expérimen-
tation dans le domaine de la perception, principalement dans la littérature
américaine avec, au besoin, quelques références à la littérature britannique
et allemande. Des chercheurs ont par la suite transformé la notion spécifique
d’erreur du stimulus en questions d’ordre expérimental dans lesquelles les at-
titudes des sujets par rapport aux tâches perceptives devinrent les variables
indépendantes à manipuler expérimentalement. Ces manipulations plaidèrent
en faveur de la distinction entre l’accès phénoménal et les aspects cognitifs des
réponses des sujets aux objets de stimulation.
Abstract: This paper examines Titchener’s notion of stimulus error in the
experimental study of mental experience. It places Titchener’s introspective
methods into the intellectual world of early experimental psychology. It fol-
lows the subsequent development of perceptual experimentation primarily in
the American literature, with notice to British and German studies as needed.
Subsequent investigators transformed the notion of a specifically stimulus error
into experimental questions in which subjects’ attitudes toward their percep-
tual tasks became independent variables to be manipulated experimentally.
Ultimately, these manipulations supported a distinction between accessing
phenomenal as opposed to cognitive aspects of subjects’ responses to stim-
ulus objects.
Philosophia Scientiæ, 19(3), 2015, 73–94.
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1 Introduction
Experimental psychology arose in the nineteenth century when experimental
techniques were applied to the investigation of mental phenomena, especially
sensory states. The early applications, at mid-century, included Ernst Heinrich
Weber’s and Gustav Fechner’s psychophysical studies of various sensory phe-
nomena and experiments on color perception by Hermann von Helmholtz and
others. In the 1880s and 1890s experimental studies multiplied, not only on
sensory phenomena but also on reaction times and memory and attention.
Together with this expanded application of experimental techniques came
methodological literatures on the new approaches. These included focused
critiques of psychophysics and wider discussions of the notion of introspection
or self-observation [Selbstbeobachtung] (e.g., [Wundt 1888], [Scripture 1899,
chap. 1], [Titchener 1912a,b]).
At first taking its place in German universities—where Wilhelm Wundt
and colleagues at Leipzig and Georg Elias Müller and colleagues at Göttingen
trained early generations of experimenters—from 1890 this avowedly “new”
psychology grew most rapidly in North America and specifically the United
States.
In the United States, the experimental psychology of introspection was
most closely allied with Edward Bradford Titchener. A classics and philosophy
undergraduate at Oxford, he took his doctorate with Wundt at Leipzig and
then accepted a position at Cornell University, teaching there from 1892 until
his death in 1927. Until at least 1915, he retained a notion of experimental or
scientific introspection as the fundamental method of psychology.1 In standard
historical surveys (e.g., [Palmer 1999, 48–50]), his approach is characterized as
bankrupt. In connection with the imageless thought controversy, his methods
provided fodder for J. B. Watson [Watson 1913, 163–164] and other detractors
who sought to undermine introspectionist and mentalist psychology.
This standard story has been challenged in various ways [Beenfeldt 2013,
ix], [Hatfield 2002]. My aim here is to follow the development of an approach
to perceptual experimentation that arose, at least partly, out of Titchener’s
methodological reflections and took on a life of its own. In Titchener’s hands,
the methodological topic concerns the “stimulus error”, which (pending closer
description) arises when experimental subjects in studies of sensory perception
focus on what they think, know, or judge the stimulus object to be, rather than
describing or indicating the characteristics of their own perceptual experience.
1. From 1915, Titchener’s publication rate diminishes and there is talk of a new
system, only part of which was written and then published posthumously [Titchener
1929]. In the 1920s, he no longer uses the term “experimental introspection” but he
still invokes the importance of experiment and of self-observation, for example, of
after-images [Titchener 1929, 41–45]. There is appreciation for a phenomenological
turn in psychology [Titchener 1925, 323], but these remarks are sketchy.
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Titchener’s brand of introspection went hand-in-hand with a theoretical
conception that sensory experience is constituted out of elements, which in-
clude “sensations”. The stimulus error occurs when, in an experiment in psy-
chophysics, subjects describe a stimulus aspect (say, the length of a line) using
knowledge or measurement of the objective physical length instead of focusing
on their own sensations (phenomenal experience of the line’s length [Titchener
1910, 7, 202]). Titchener’s concerns arose within a theoretical outlook that
sought to isolate, as much as is possible, meaningless sensations as the ulti-
mate constituents of integrated perceptions—the line as a black extent, not
treated as a mark on a surface.
Interpreters disagree on the specific characteristics of Titchener’s theoret-
ical framework and its intellectual origins. Some characterize Titchener as
hewing theoretically to traditional English associationism [Beenfeldt 2013],
[Brock 2013, 30–31], while others have him turning to embrace a German tra-
dition stemming from Wundt and Oswald Külpe (Wundt’s assistant when
Titchener was at Leipzig) [Boring 1929, 402–413].2 The sensory atomism
of both traditions, along with the introspective search for elemental dimen-
sions of phenomenal experience, came under challenge on several fronts,
especially in the Gestalt psychologists’ notion of direct experience, e.g.,
[Köhler 1929, 8, 35], which was well known in the American context.3
Nonetheless, the role of Titchener’s discussion as an impetus to methodologi-
cal reflection in experimental sensory psychology should not be undervalued.
By tracing the subsequent fate of discussions initiated over stimulus error, we
can follow a notion of introspection or experimental introspection that contin-
ues to the present day.
2. Titchener was at Leipzig from 1890 to 1892. Külpe was first there in 1881-
1882, returning as Wundt’s student in 1886, taking his doctorate in 1887 (on a topic
begun with Müller in Göttingen) and becoming Wundt’s assistant. He published his
Outlines in 1893 [Külpe 1893], was promoted to extraordinary professor, and left in
1894 for Würzburg. Külpe dedicated the book to Wundt. He agreed with Wundt that
sensations are simple elements but differed in ascribing spatial attributes to visual
and tactual sensations [Külpe 1893, 335, 373]. (They also disagreed in interpret-
ing reaction-time experiments.) Titchener translated Külpe’s book, as he did some
of Wundt’s. Külpe’s (and the Würzburger’s) radical divergences from Wundt and
Titchener on imageless thought started after 1905. When in 1909 Titchener accused
the Würzburgers of the “stimulus-error” [Titchener 1909, 145], he was applying a
concept he had already developed.
3. The Gestaltists active in America (primarily, Wolfgang Köhler, Kurt Koffka,
and Max Wertheimer; later joined by Kurt Lewin) were opposed to the introspective
search for simple elements, which Köhler criticized early [Köhler 1913]. Still, they
advocated starting from what Köhler called “direct experience” [Köhler 1929, chap. 1–
2], which may itself be seen as a form of introspection [Hatfield 2002, 2005]. According
to Köhler, “direct experience” is of a world of meaningful objects (a lake, some trees,
a boulder) in three dimensions. An honest description of such experience would be a
naive description of this world (as containing a lake before one, a boulder to sit on,
and so on), which does not privilege descriptions based in the science of physics.
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This paper examines Titchener’s notion of stimulus error in relation to
the experimental investigation of phenomenal experience, or what he vari-
ously termed (conscious) “mental experience” [Titchener 1897, 12], or “human
experience considered as dependent on the experiencing person” [Titchener
1910, 16]. It follows the subsequent development of perceptual experimenta-
tion primarily in the American literature, with notice to British and German
studies that entered this stream. It discusses how Titchener’s outlook was
eventually supplanted by more sophisticated approaches to perceptual exper-
imentation and by less theory-driven descriptions of phenomenal experience.
These new approaches to perceptual experimentation did not seek specifically
to neutralize subjects’ presumed favoring of physical descriptions, but rendered
subjects’ attitudes toward both stimulus objects and their own experiences as
independent variables to be manipulated and evaluated experimentally. They
sought to reveal what the manipulation of attitude could uncover about both
phenomenal and cognitive aspects of subjects’ perceptual responses.
2 Titchener, introspection, and the
stimulus error
Although Boring reviews several applications of the term “stimulus-error”
[Boring 1921], its primary meaning derives from Titchener, who finds that
even though subjects in experiments have been directed to report on sen-
sations, they instead make responses using their beliefs about the physical
stimulus:
We are constantly confusing sensations with their stimuli, with
their objects, with their meanings. Or rather—since the sen-
sation of psychology has no object or meaning—we are con-
stantly confusing logical abstraction with psychological analysis;
we abstract a certain aspect of an object or meaning, and then
treat this aspect as if it were a simple mental process, an el-
ement in the mental representation of the object or meaning.
[Titchener 1905a, xxvi]4
The “error” results when, instead of holding object-perception and meaning in
abeyance, the subject gathers an object-content from perception and reports
it. Titchener gives examples from auditory, gustatory, and haptic perception
and describes the tendency in visual spatial perception to overlook sensations
4. Titchener introduces the term itself in the instructor’s part of his lab manual,
using the formulation “R-error”, where “R” stands for German Reiz, meaning “stimu-
lus” [Titchener 1905b, lxiii, 198]. The English “stimulus-error” is found at [Titchener
1909, 145]. Titchener’s claim that sensations have no intrinsic meaning is based in
theory; he ultimately does not claim that we must be able to experience sensations
in complete isolation [Titchener 1915].
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(which correspond to “peripheral cues”) in favor of objects arrayed in space
[Titchener 1910, 314]. According to him, the elemental sensations of vision
are bidimensional (planar), and we acquire perception of the third dimension
(or depth) [Titchener 1910, 303–306].
Titchener’s notion of stimulus error must be understood in the wider con-
text of his psychological theory. He believes it should be possible to focus
on sensations, or at least phenomenal dimensions of sensations (e.g., hues,
pitches), by ignoring “meaning”, including any conception of an object as pos-
sessing its own attributes. Let us consider his theoretical commitments as they
condition his notion of stimulus error.
2.1 The background to Titchener’s theoretical
conceptions
Boring described Titchener as “an Englishman who represented the German
psychological tradition in America” [Boring 1929, 402]. This oft-repeated char-
acterization has been challenged. Beenfeldt forcefully argues that Titchener
was rather a representative of British associationism [Beenfeldt 2013].
Beenfeldt attributes four characteristics to British associationism, which
he also finds in Titchener’s thought:
(1) a reductive decomposition of human mental life into (2) el-
ements that ultimately are (3) sensationistic in nature and (4)
follow certain law-like regularities (e.g., the classical laws of asso-
ciation). [Beenfeldt 2013, 41]
Accordingly, David Hume, David Hartley, and James and John Stuart Mill
provide the fundamental background for Titchener’s psychology, including a
notion of “mental chemistry”, according to which associations can yield novel
qualities, taken from John Stuart Mill [Beenfeldt 2013, 42].
In fact, Titchener rejected or modified all of these points and was highly
critical of the “English” associationism.5 Rather than asserting outright that
5. His criticisms gained strength and explicitness between the early Outline
of Psychology [Titchener 1897, 190–191] and later works [Titchener 1909, 22–37],
[Titchener 1910, 374–395]. Those emphasizing Titchener’s English background often
quote this sentence from the Outline: “The general standpoint of the book is that of
the traditional English psychology” [Titchener 1897, vi], while omitting the ensuing
sentence: “The system which is outlined in it, however, stands also in the closest re-
lation to that presented in the more advanced treatises of the German experimental
school, Külpe’s Outlines of Psychology and Wundt’s Grundzüge der physiologischen
Psychologie” [Titchener 1897, vi]. We may ask what general aspect of the “English”
psychology Titchener meant to endorse and what aspects of “system” he gleaned from
Wundt and Külpe. Perhaps he adopted the general framework of introspection and
elements from British psychology; but he rejected much of the rest of their framework,
as he understood it (including sensations as “static” elements [Titchener 1915, 265]).
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mental life can be reduced to sensational elements and their laws of combina-
tion, he adopted decomposition into elements as a “heuristic” attitude, which
reflected his estimation that science begins with analysis into constituents.
His elements were provisional. He distinguished his “sensationalism” from
traditional “associationism”, contending that the latter (a) did not properly
distinguish epistemology from psychology; (b) treated ideas as static entities,
like the blocks out of which a mosaic is constructed, rather than as transi-
tory processes, as, he says, Wundt has taught us to think; and (c) invoked
the superseded notion of mental chemistry.6 He rejected the traditional “laws
of association” for trying to connect “ideas” as static epistemological blocks
[Titchener 1909, 24–28] and as overemphasizing connections based on succes-
sion as opposed to simultaneity [Titchener 1910, 390].
A more promising conceptual background for Titchener’s description of
the stimulus error is the general distinction between sensations, or sensa-
tional elements, and perception of objects through complex ideas or represen-
tations. Such a distinction can be found in traditional associative accounts,
but Titchener was more in tune with Wundt’s elementism.7 Wundt defined
sensations [Empfindungen] as “those states of our consciousness that cannot
be analyzed into simpler constituents” [Wundt 1880, 1: 271]. They differ
among themselves only in quality and intensity. Sensations from the sense
organs divide into those of touch, sound, temperature, smell, taste, and sight
(light) [Wundt 1880, 1: 272, 278–279]. Perceptions [Wahrnehmungen], which
Wundt also called intuitions [Anschauungen], are by contrast a type of idea
[Vorstellung], namely, one that “refers to an actual object” present to the
senses [Wundt 1880, 2: 1].
The distinction between elemental sensations and perceptions of objects
was deeply embedded in German sensory psychology. Helmholtz prominently
and notoriously wrote that we ignore our sensations except insofar as they
Although he did not accept Wundt’s voluntarism [Titchener 1909, 36–37] with its
active subject [Titchener 1897, 119–120], he did accept Wundt’s search for elements
conceived as “processes” and his conception that sensory processes include “passive
experiences”, that is, laws of connection yielding syntheses that are in some ways
associative [Wundt 1901, 24, 276].
6. He held that experimental psychology has “transcended” the chemical analogy
[Titchener 1909, 32]; Wundt, too, had recently found aspects of disanalogy between
chemical and psychical synthesis [Wundt 1893, 2: 46], [Wundt 1908, 269–271], after
earlier using the analogy without apology [Wundt 1880, 2: 28].
7. Wundt scholarship since the 1980s has curiously denied that Wundt sought the
elements of sensory processes; see [Beenfeldt 2013, 29]. It is almost as if, having
discovered that certain aspects of Wundt had been de-emphasized in America, such
as his voluntarism and his ethnographic psychology, scholars felt the need to define
Wundt exclusively in terms of what had been omitted. But despite his emphasis
on active synthesis, apperception, attention, and the will, Wundt regarded sensory
processes as involving the synthesis of elemental sensations and set as a task for
psychology the discovery of elemental processes [Wundt 1880, 1: 271], [Wundt 1901,
29–31].
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are informative of external objects, which are, accordingly, the usual objects
of our perceptions proper. The elemental sensations that initially arise from
sensory stimulation become so embedded in external perception that we are
unaware of the sensations themselves and their relations: “the connection
between sensations and external objects may interfere very much with the
perception of their simplest relations” [Helmholtz 1866, 3: 9].8 Helmholtz in
fact adopted, as did Wundt, the view that sensations are non-spatial and that
all spatial organization takes place by learning. Wundt more generally held
that the psychologist always begins from “composite psychical experience”
and seeks “psychical elements” by a process of “analysis and abstraction”
[Wundt 1901, 32].
Titchener was well aware of Helmholtz’s and Wundt’s postulation of non-
spatial sensations [Titchener 1910, 304–305], but nonetheless maintained that
primitive visual sensations are two-dimensional.9 At the same time, he ac-
cepted that naive subjects naturally attend to objects and their properties as
opposed to sensations. Ernst Mach also endorsed a distinction between sen-
sation or sensory elements and complexes of such elements [Mach 1886]. And
in America, George T. Ladd, an early expositor of the “new” psychology, fol-
lowed the German tradition closely. He distinguished between “sensations” (as
“modes of our being”) and presentations of “objects” or “things” with their
inherent properties. The latter perceptions are a product of development,
so that an adult psychologist “does not remember by what stages he first
learned to see or feel the extended and external objects of sense” [Ladd 1889,
382]. Nonetheless, he held that presentations are elaborated “from the ma-
terial of simple sensations” through various processes, including a Wundtian
“synthetic” process [Wundt 1880, 2: 29, 164, 177], which he glossed as a “con-
structive” process [Ladd 1889, 387–388].
8. Helmholtz expressed this outlook in an early lecture on music (Bonn, 1857):
“It is a universal law of the perceptions obtained through the senses that we pay
only so much attention to our sensations as is sufficient for us to recognize external
objects. [...] All sensations which have no direct reference to external objects we
are accustomed, as a matter of course, entirely to ignore” [Helmholtz 1896, 98]. He
was speaking of the upper partial tones that can be isolated through practice or
using laboratory instruments, which, as he saw it, allows the listener to discover in a
musical note—originally heard simply as the sounding of an instrument—a complex
set of partial tones. Terminologically, Helmholtz distinguished the “sensations of
vision” [Gesichtsempfindungen], comprising light and color, from the “perceptions of
vision” [Gesichtswahrnehmungen], extending to the “existence, form and position of
external objects”; perceptions are formed from sensations [Helmholtz 1866, 2: v; 3:
1; also, 3: 533]. His more intricate terminological distinctions [Helmholtz 1866, 3:
10] need not detain us.
9. The idea that sensations originally are aspatial and possess only quality and
intensity became prominent in the nineteenth century together with the notion that
each sensory nerve fiber produces a single sensation [Hatfield 1990, 157–158, 184]. In
denying this tenet of Wundt and Helmholtz, Titchener sided with older theory but
also with a recent trend among his contemporaries.
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2.2 Titchener, introspective analysis, and synthesis
Titchener echoed the general sort of distinction made by Helmholtz, Wundt,
Mach, and Ladd, in distinguishing (a) sensations as elements having the
attributes of quality, intensity, temporal duration, and (sometimes) spatial
extent—aspects of which one may hope to partially isolate in consciousness—
from (b) perceptions compounded from sensations and imbued with meaning
by their relation to other sensations. His psychology aimed to find the basic
elements of mental life by analysis (provisionally, the basic elements are sensa-
tions, images, and affections or emotions) [Titchener 1910, 36–41, 47–48]. This
analysis was then supplemented by a synthesis of the elements to constitute
complex perception.10 Such syntheses yield psychological “meanings”, which
are contexts of sensations and, in a manner not fully explained, yield reference
to objects via organism-environment interaction [Titchener 1909, 175–179].
“Pure perceptions”, which are rare, would be complexes only of sensations;
“mixed perceptions” include both sensations and images (often, memory im-
ages) [Titchener 1910, 364–365].
Titchener held that although the sensations of vision are two-dimensional
and come from two eyes, we nonetheless experience unitary objects at a
distance through meaning. Accordingly, perceivers normally overlook the
pervasive double images found in a stationary field of objects at various
distances under steady fixation. While acknowledging other factors, such
as roving fixations or suppression of one image, he attributed binocular
unity “perhaps mainly, to cortical set or adjustment; we mean, expect,
are disposed to see singly things that are objectively single” [Titchener 1910,
309, note 1]. Still, in a psychological experiment, if experiencing a double im-
age, one should report it on pain of committing the stimulus error. In such
experiments, one is not aiming to elicit a physical description of an objectively
single object. Titchenerian sensory experimentation aims for a description of
experience, and not a report based on knowledge of objects from past expe-
rience or on an interpretation (that a single object is present) gleaned from
their double vision.
It was part of Titchener’s view that sensations and images are adequate
to account for all the content of perception. In his Text-Book, at the end of
the long section on perception, he discussed an objection to his outlook that
perception involves only sensations as supplemented by images and mean-
ings [Titchener 1910, 367–368]. According to the objection, the contents of
perceptions are more than the combination of their parts. Complexes such
as melodies or shapes include as a distinct element a “form of combination”.
Accordingly, a square is
10. In addition, Titchener’s psychology includes explanation through the physiolog-
ical conditions of mental life, which leads to his psychophysical parallelism and denial
that neural processes cause mental processes while still claiming that physiology is
explanatory in psychology [Titchener 1910, 39–41], views that cannot be examined
here.
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more than four linear extensions, sensibly of the same length,
and occupying certain relative positions in the visual field; [...]
squareness is a new character, common to all squares, but not to
be explained by attention, or by the laws of sensory connection,
or by those of imaginal supplementing. [Titchener 1910, 372]11
His reply to this objection is revealing of his conception of the (at least
provisional) task of experimental and introspective psychology. To the pro-
posal that a “form of synthesis” is distinct from the elements as synthesized,
he answered:
this attitude betrays a confusion of the analytic and the genetic
points of view. We cannot generate the square from lines, or
the melody from rhythm and scale; but neither is that what we
try to do. The square and the melody are given, as perceptions.
Our psychological task is to analyse these given perceptions, to
discover their elements, and to formulate the laws under which
the elementary processes combine. That done, we can write, for
“square” and “melody”, “these and these elements connected in
these and these uniform ways”, and we can go on to search for
physiological conditions (§ 9). We have solved our problem in
analytical terms; we have not first defined the terms, and then
put them together to produce something that was not contained
in the definition.—The author cannot, in his own introspection,
identify the form of combination as a distinct mental element.
[Titchener 1910, 372–373]
There is a lot that might be discussed in this quotation.12 But the main
point is clear: Titchener is committed to a psychology of elements and firmly
believes that organized wholes, such as melodies or shapes, can be derived by
11. Titchener [Titchener 1910, 372] cited the English philosopher-psychologist
G. F. Stout as holding this position [Stout 1909, 2: 48] and recommended a related ar-
ticle by I.M. Bentley. The article [Bentley 1902] discussed Mach, Ehrenfels, Meinong,
Cornelius, Witasek, and Stout, all of whom save Cornelius are cited in [Titchener
1909]. Later [Titchener 1929], he cited Mach, Meinong, Witasek, and Stout, the
last three as adherents of a Brentanian “psychology of act”. He did not address
the Gestalt psychologists who became prominent in the United States (Wertheimer,
Koffka, and Köhler), citing [Titchener 1929, 229, note 207] only an early paper by
Koffka on Vorstellungen. However, Chapter 3, in which act psychology is discussed,
was completed by 1919 [Titchener 1929, xvii–xix], before the systematic writings of
the Gestalt trio had appeared.
12. In the quotation, “genetic” means developmental. He here allows that we do
not introspectively consider isolated sensations separately and then conjoin them in
thought. Rather, the psychologist starts from experience of the square and seeks the
elements (sensations or images) that could be conjoined to form the square. He is not
committed to the elements being present before the square; rather, through analysis,
they are found to be adequate constituents for it.
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the summation of parts—while granting that it is the wholes that are given in
experience.
Titchener, then, was trained into a world in which a sensation-perception
distinction was widely accepted. There was disagreement on whether visual
sensations are non-spatial or two dimensional. But it was widely agreed that
uninitiated subjects focus on perceived objects rather than sensations. That
is, in ordinary life, observers focus on objects, not the sensations caused by
those objects.
2.3 Titchener and introspection as observation
Although Titchener believed that sensations are primitive (not further ana-
lyzable) elements of mental life, for him even the seasoned introspector does
not experience unvarnished sensations. Rather, we discover the properties of
sensations by establishing conditions for focusing on them and then report-
ing introspectively on their attributes, such as quality, intensity, or duration.
Typically, all of these attributes cannot be attended to at once or made the
subject of a single report. Moreover, sensations may become so connected
with other sensations that their attributes (quality, intensity, extent) cannot
be introspectively isolated [Titchener 1910, 51].
Titchener regarded introspection as a form of observation [Titchener 1912b,
486–487]. Observation involves “attention to the phenomena, and record of
the phenomena” [Titchener 1910, 20]. In an introspective experiment, the job
of the subject is to describe experience as it is, as opposed to guessing about
the stimulus:
The question, however, so far as the validity of introspection is
concerned, is not whether the reports tally with the stimuli, but
whether they give accurate descriptions of the observer’s exper-
imental consciousness; they might be fantastically wrong in the
first regard, and yet absolutely accurate in regard to conscious
contents. [Titchener 1912b, 489]
In saying that introspection is observation applied to mental experience,
Titchener did not mean to assert that it involves the observation of a special
mental object that is distinct from what he considered to be the objects of
everyday perception (physical objects with various properties). In particular,
he did not suppose that in introspecting a sensory experience one turns away
from the world and looks within. There is a deep and persistent misunder-
standing of classical introspection on this point. Titchener himself tried to
allay this misunderstanding. Because the misinterpretation is so pervasive, he
is worth quoting in full. He finds:
that certain psychologists, in writing of self-observation, think of
the “mind” as in some way “turning in upon itself”, very much
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as one might fancifully conceive of the eyes as turning about to
view the brain; that this mental gymnastic appeals to them as
something far more difficult of performance than the direction
of the mind to the outer world; and that they are thus led to
regard self-observation as the mind’s crowning achievement, the
signal difference between man and the lower animals [...] the
psychological observer is supposed to be aware of himself as in-
trospecting himself, aware of himself as observer and aware of
himself as observed, while at the same time he is aware of the
relation of the two selves [...] as a matter of fact, introspection
knows nothing of this sort of mind or self and its performances.
Introspection is an interrogation of experience; as such, it issues
either from a present conscious purpose or from a habit of observa-
tion which is the resultant of previous conscious purpose; and, in
so far, it is the expression of “reflection” or of “reflective thought”.
In so far, but no farther: it implies self-consciousness only in
the sense and to the degree in which all scientific observation,
that of physics and chemistry included, implies self-consciousness.
[Titchener 1912a, 440]
He goes on explicitly to reject the view that in introspection there are “two
objects,—on the one hand, the mental operation itself which is to be ob-
served, and on the other, the object to which this mental operation is directed”
[Titchener 1912a, 441]. Titchener here stays close to Wundt [Wundt 1888, 293,
296, 306–307], who was careful to observe that in saying psychology takes “im-
mediate experience” which is “inner” as its object, “the expressions outer and
inner experience do not indicate different objects, but different points of view
from which we take up the consideration and scientific treatment of a unitary
experience” [Wundt 1901, 2–3]. In introspection, one focuses on how external
objects appear [Hatfield 2005, 272–275].
This form of observation can be undertaken by psychologists possessing
divergent theoretical outlooks. These outlooks may yield disagreements about
what is a simple or basic element of sensory experience and what is the artificial
product of a special point of view. According to Titchener, if one succeeds in
focusing on the pitch of an upper partial tone in a musical note, one has noticed
an attribute of a primitive, constituent element that was present in the tone
all along [Titchener 1910, 100–101]. Because Titchener held that visual sensa-
tions are primitively bidimensional, he held that when spatial perception tends
toward the two-dimensional under reduced-cue conditions, the experimenter is
inducing “primitive” spatial sensations. Others disagreed, holding that the act
of attention changes the experience of the tone, so as to highlight the overtone
[Köhler 1913, 14–22], or that when an experience as of a two-dimensional field
occurs under a special attitude or reduced stimulus conditions, the experience
as reported is genuine but artificial [Koffka 1935, 235–236], [Gibson 1950, 42].
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In these cases, there need be no disagreement on the description of the
experiences themselves. The Gestaltist might well hear the partial tones. But
they give them a different theoretical interpretation: they are not elements
uncovered, but a product of perceptual reorganization. Titchener’s claim that
the partial tone is getting closer to elemental sensations is a product of the-
ory [Titchener 1915]. Introspection doesn’t settle the matter, for different
schools might agree in their introspective reports. In fact, the Gestalt assault
on Titchenerian elements [Köhler 1913] was aimed more at the theoretical
positing of unnoticed sensations than at empirical claims. The Gestaltists
proposed a new theory of what is basic in experience: a three-dimensional
world of meaningful objects [Köhler 1929, chap. 1–2], [Koffka 1935, chap. 1–3].
Others delayed grand theory in order to study more closely the relation be-
tween different aspects of phenomenal experience. In this, they were following
up Titchener’s warning about the stimulus error but widening the context of
experimental investigation.
3 Ongoing discussions of stimulus error and
phenomenal report
Titchener’s notion of introspective observation and his distinction between a
report of sensory experience and a focus on object properties remained valu-
able. His idea that introspection involves attention to dimensions or attributes
of perceptual experience was widely applicable, even to conceptions of the
content of that experience foreign to his own. As Titchener observed, even
James, the arch anti-atomist, nonetheless found describable characters or at-
tributes in the unitary stream of consciousness, taking note of “flights and
perchings”13 or of various sensation-attributes that we can abstract from the
stream. “Voluminousness” or spatiality is, according to James, a distinguish-
able feature of experience [James 1890, 2: 134–136]. We can attend to this
aspect of experience and report its characteristics. In this sense it is an ele-
ment of experience, but not an atomic constituent out of which experience is
compounded [James 1890, chap. 6].
James and Titchener agreed on the need to distinguish reports on sensory
experiences from reports of stimulus properties as physical properties. James
contended that a primary error in psychology arises from the ill effects of
speech: we name our mental states by the objects that cause them and then
“assume that as the objects are, so the thought must be” [James 1890, 1: 195].
This is effectively a description of the stimulus error. James feared that such
an error would yield an overly fragmented description of experience, mirroring
13. Titchener refers to James’s phenomenological point [James 1890, 1: 243], that
the stream of consciousness does not flow uniformly, but consists of “flights” (“tran-
sitive parts”) and “perchings” (“substantive parts”, experienced for the moment).
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the known physical constituents of the situation. Titchener rued the error
because it could lead to the description of a stable, unified, constant physical
object in place of varying and discrete sensory attributes or sensations. The
two authors differed over what is fundamental in perceptual consciousness,
with James being skeptical of atomic elements. I am interested in both their
commonalities and differences, and their relations to subsequent descriptions
of phenomenally immediate sensory experience.
3.1 Changing attitudes toward “direct experience”
James, like Titchener, accepted that spatiality is part of sensory experience
[James 1890, 2: 135–136]. He did not hold that we visually perceive depth and
distance innately. Nor did he hold that our sensory experience tracks the real
sizes of things. Coming close to Titchener’s subsequent analysis of stimulus
error, he held that when we perceive things such as dinner plates at different
distances, we attribute to them the same sizes as when they are close. We
do this not because of our sensory state, which he held varies with the retinal
image, but because we impose a standard size, as a “meaning”. Plates farther
away “feel” smaller, but we “overlook” that fact because we “know” them to
be equal in size [James 1890, 2: 179–180].
Titchener was aware that some theorists held the third dimension to be
directly sensed. Earlier, Ewald Hering held that in binocular vision we im-
mediately perceive height, width, and depth [Hering 1864, 324]. Titchener
objected that this position is “psychologically impossible”. He elaborated:
Sensations of height and breadth might pass muster, if we mean
by them qualitative local signs, but a sensation of depth is an
impossibility: depth has no specific quality that can be seen, and,
if it had, we have no sense-organ wherewith to see it. [Titchener
1910, 338]
Presumably, Titchener means to affirm a Berkeleyan point that the visual
stimulus is unable to produce experiences of distance directly, perhaps because
it has only two dimensions itself. But he also makes a phenomenal point: there
is no “experience” of depth or distance.14
Soon, others besides Hering were rejecting both points. In the teens and
twenties, researchers related to the Gestaltists found phenomenal size con-
stancy [Köhler 1929, 105]: that phenomenal experience does not vary directly
with proximal stimulation, but includes depth and distance. Accordingly, when
14. Hering held that binocular stimulation, through corresponding and disparate
points, is a stimulus for depth [Hering 1864]. Koffka held that three-dimensional
spatial forms arise in visual experience through Gestalt laws of organization [Koffka
1935, 161]. Here, Titchener might be accused of the stimulus error regarding the
proximal (two-dimensional) retinal image, using knowledge of the image to describe
what is fundamental in visual experience.
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dinner plates are seen at different distances around the table, even though
those farther away subtend a smaller visual angle, they are experienced phe-
nomenally with roughly the same size. In 1929, Köhler published, in English,
in the United States, a systematic introduction to the Gestalt point of view,
entitled Gestalt Psychology. He argued for taking phenomenally direct expe-
rience at face value. Instead of seeing the constancy of size as a constructed
meaning for the “real” (two-dimensional) sensations, he argued that the direct
experience of the world as in depth should, at least initially, be treated as a
description of actual sensory experience.
Once it was accepted that visual experience might be treated as phenom-
enally three-dimensional, it became possible to conceive of doing experiments
to test the characteristics of subjects’ perceptions under various conditions, in
order to distinguish different kinds of experiences and different aspects of sub-
jects’ responses. Perhaps sometimes subjects do guess or cognitively evaluate
physical properties of things from prior knowledge as applied to phenomenal
experience. Perhaps in other cases they can be induced to describe phenome-
nal experience as they have it. This became the new goal. Instead of assuming
that subjects naturally tend toward a cognitively based “stimulus error”, the
question of how subjects approach the perceptual task was to be brought under
experimental control.
3.2 Stimulus error and instructional set in size-
perception experiments
The first decades of the twentieth century witnessed a lively discussion on the
effect of attitude or “set” on psychophysical experiments, including close dis-
cussion of using instructions to affect perceptual set. Much of this discussion
focused on the relation between judgments of “equality” between two stim-
uli (or experiences) and judgments of uncertainty over whether they differ.
Samuel Fernberger and others attributed some equivocal results to the fact
that subjects were not given clear “tasks” [Aufgabe] with respect to the judg-
ments, allowing the “set” or attitude [Einstellung] behind their judgments to
vary without experimental control [Fernberger 1914]. More generally, some
psychologists regarded it is as a mistake to ask for anything except a report on
the physical stimulus itself (a position associated with James McKeen Cattell).
Boring entered this discussion with his paper on stimulus error [Boring
1921]. His goal was to show that even “behaviorists” and other “psychologists
of capacity” (including Cattell) need to distinguish between physical stimulus
and sensation if they are to avoid equivocal data arising from the stimulus
error. He characterized the stimulus error as follows:
We commit the stimulus-error if we base our psychological re-
ports upon objects rather than upon the mental material itself, or
if, in the psycho-physical experiment, we make judgments of the
stimulus and not judgments of sensation. [Boring 1921, 451]
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The remedy is to control through instructions the attention of subjects and
the criteria they employ in making a judgment. In the article, Boring made
incidental reference to these issues as they arise for size perception. In the
ensuing decades from the 1930s through the 1960s, there was ongoing dis-
cussion and refinement of the use of instructions in experiments on size and
shape perception.
These discussions challenged a fundamental aspect of the notion of “stim-
ulus error”: the claim that subjects tend to judge according to physical esti-
mation or reasoning rather than appearances. The assumption that subjects
naturally make physical estimates is evident in an early size-perception experi-
ment by Martius, who wanted to prevent subjects from employing this attitude
so that they could focus on appearances [Martius 1889, 605]. Going forward,
experimenters at first made conflicting claims about the natural tendencies
of uninstructed subjects. Ultimately, they instead employed instructions to
control task and attitude for all observations, and then theorized about the
responses they elicited under these varying conditions.
Writing in the early thirties, R.H. Thouless held that an undirected and
unstudied response of the “average subject” would seek to report the apparent
properties of shape (and also size), since assessment of objective physical size
requires a “more complex process of judgement” [Thouless 1931b, 23]. In
discussing such tendencies, Thouless distinguished among “real”, “projective”,
and “apparent or ‘phenomenal’ ” shape:
Let us suppose that a subject is asked to report on the shape
of an inclined plane figure whose shape is not previously known
to him. He might be answering any one of three questions:
(1) as to the “real” shape of the object observed, (2) as to the
shape of its plane projection, (3) as to its apparent or “phenom-
enal” shape. It is only in answering number 3 that he is per-
forming the simple operation of reporting immediate experience.
[Thouless 1931b, 22]
Thouless usefully distinguishes among different tasks. But his experiments did
not make task, attitude, or set into a variable; he instead controlled for the
subject’s attitude by relating that he, as experimenter, wants “to know [from
the subject] neither what the shape of the object really is nor how he thinks it
ought to look but simply the shape it does look to him” [Thouless 1931b, 23].
He did not relate his experimental approach to discussions of stimulus error
in Titchener and Boring; he framed his approach as an application of Hering’s
discussions of lightness constancy to textbook descriptions of shape constancy
as the norm [Thouless 1931a, 339, 343].
Other experimentalists did connect the study size perception and shape
perception with the ongoing discussion of instructions. This group also did
not believe that subjects naturally tend toward the “stimulus error” but as-
sumed that subjects normally respond to appearances. But they did not fix
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ahead of time what the “correct” character of experience should be (e.g., two-
dimensional sensations for sight). By varying instructional set, they turned
the question of how subjects make judgments about size and shape into an
object of investigation. They retained the distinction, found in Titchener,
Boring, and Thouless, between “immediate” judgments of experience versus
complex cognitive judgments that apply to appearances reasoning about how
size varies with distance.
In seminal experiments, Beverley Holaday15 studied size perception un-
der varying experimental conditions, including variations in “intentional set”,
which he characterized as psychological variations (as opposed to physical vari-
ations in the stimulus situation or physiological variations). He distinguished
four different attitudes for comparing the sizes of two stimulus objects: (1)
the “normal attitude”, in which we judge the “visual size” of the “visual ob-
ject” as in everyday perception (this correlates with Thouless’s phenomenal or
apparent judgment); (2) the “analytic” attitude, in which one seeks through in-
structions to direct subjects toward a projective estimate based on perceptual
attitude alone, without using techniques such as squinting and without theo-
retical reasoning; (3) “objective procedure”, in which subjects are instructed
to estimate the suspected size of the object using the appearance but supple-
menting it by moving their heads from side to side and using reflection to give
their best bet about the correct sizes; and (4) the “analytic bet-procedure”,
of seeking to judge what the projective value must be using techniques such
as squinting or reflecting on what the photographic size would be [Holaday
1933, 422]. These instructional sets equate the “normal” attitude with appar-
ent instructions but also bring that condition under the experimental control
of instructions.
As research proceeded, investigators gave up claims to know beforehand
the “basic” attitude of subjects and became interested in the dynamics of the
various instruction sets [Carlson 1962]. Investigators noted some apparently
paradoxical results. An empirical trend developed in which objective instruc-
tions yielded overconstancy for size perception, apparent instructions yielded
slight underconstancy, and projective instructions produced a result toward
projective values, but not reaching them [Holway & Boring 1941], [Gilinsky
1955].16 The question now concerned not the “stimulus error”, but James,
15. Holaday was an American investigator who did doctoral work at the University
of Vienna with Karl Bühler among his teachers.
16. There is another dimension of discussions about Titchenerian introspection and
subsequent perceptual experimentation, which concerns the subject. Titchener, like
Wundt and indeed [Holway & Boring 1941], employed as subjects students or col-
leagues trained in perception science. This might lead to a charge that theoretical
bias infects the outcome, or it might mean that observers are more accurate because
they are trained scientists (see [Schwitzgebel 2011]). In any event, in [Gilinsky 1955]
we see the modern practice of using a large group of naive subjects in perceptual
experimentation, rather than a few trained observers.
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Titchener, Boring, and Thouless’s explanation of it: that “non-apparent” judg-
ments arise from cognitive factors.
4 Sequel
How one continues the story from here depends on an assessment of which
positions have panned out, which in turn is conditioned by theory-dependent
assessments of the fundamental characteristics of perceptual experience. For
instance, a naive realist would have a different account of the role of instruc-
tions, translating them into the language of taking different conceptual atti-
tudes toward objective stimulus values as directly present in normal percep-
tion. I have no sympathy with this approach since I believe that naive realism
is a non-starter.17
The story directly continues in recent findings of the developmental psy-
chologist Carl Granrud, which vindicate the distinction between phenome-
nal reports and cognitively complex reports [Granrud 2012]. In studying size
constancy in child development, Granrud found that some children, when in-
structed to report objective size, engage in a strategy of reasoning that things
look smaller in the distance. Other children do not use such strategies or
do so later. When he compared the two groups under conditions of appar-
ent and objective instructions for near and far stimuli, all subjects showed
slight underconstancy under both instructions for near stimuli. For far stim-
uli, instructional set made no difference for non-strategy users. Strategy users
exhibited underconstancy under apparent instructions and overconstancy un-
der objective instructions. Granrud ruled out (on phenomenal grounds) the
conclusion that strategy users actually see more distant things as larger than
they are. Consequently, he attributed that response to cognitive factors (rea-
soning according to a strategy). He classified the judgments under apparent
instructions as reports of phenomenal experience.
In my terms, the apparent reports are cases of introspection. They are
instances in which subjects are directed toward their experience of size, as a
phenomenally available aspect of their experience.18 They are not everyday
17. Another objection comes from “transparency” theorists who might suppose
that there can be no stimulus error and no truly “apparent” instructions because
the content of perception is exhausted through representations of the physical object.
This position is often paired, e.g., [Harman 1990] with the misreading of Wundt and
Titchener on introspection (discussed above). More generally, transparency theorists
try to settle questions about the metaphysics of qualities through phenomenology,
but their phenomenology relies on their metaphysics [Hatfield 2005, 270–274].
18. I discuss introspection as “deliberate and immediate attention to certain aspects
of phenomenal experience” in [Hatfield 2005, 279]. Chirimuuta [Chirimuuta 2014,
915–918] finds problems in distinguishing introspection from simply perceiving on
this definition, but I believe that the notion of attending to phenomenal experience
does the trick. Schwitzgebel adopts a similar conception of introspection in visual
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judgments of how large the object over there is—that would be an objective
report. They differ from such reports in that subjects are directed to attend
to certain aspects of their phenomenal experience. Objective reports are not
introspective, though they may rely on an introspective assessment of appear-
ances. Once subjects have become strategy users, objective instructions in-
duce them to use reasoning to report what can be known of objective stimulus
properties. Such reports are not a matter of simply attending to phenomenally
available dimensions of experience.
In the ongoing history of experiments that seek to study size and shape
perception, there is an echo of Titchener’s distinction between accurate de-
scriptions of experience and judgments focused on physical values of a stimulus
object. But this distinction has been decoupled from assumptions about the
elemental structure of phenomenal experience. There are few takers these days
for the view that visual experience is “really” two dimensional. Rather, the
characteristics of visual experience are to be determined by varying stimulus
conditions and instructional set. Further, descriptions of phenomenal experi-
ence are to be distinguished from judgments of physical values. In this way,
the earlier distinctions drawn by Titchener and James have received a new use,
or a reformulated application. Investigators no longer speak of the “stimulus
error”, but they do seek to tease apart phenomenal and cognitive (judgmental)
factors in the complex of human perceptual experience. Indeed, recent find-
ings by Granrud support the notion that introspective reports of apparent size
describe phenomenal experience while reports that apply reasoning strategies
to experience in order to judge objective size are manifestations of a cognitive
response that goes beyond a description of phenomenal experience. In this
context, a distinction between how things appear and how we judge them to
be retains its validity, giving a partial vindication to Titchener’s earlier notion
of stimulus error.
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